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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which econornic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - at  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work at  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits;  and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The  research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
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ABSTRACT 
We argue that the search for a dynamic theory of strategy and for a link between the 
product-market and resource-based views may be incomplete without an exploration of 
the evolution of the technology that underlies products and heterogeneous firm 
capability. As technology evolves, so do industry characteristics, products, and critical 
success factors. Firms without the right capabilities are forced to exit. Thus an industry's 
structure, attractiveness and the kinds of capabilities that it needs to succeed, may vary 
over time suggesting different strategies for each phase. 
(Key words: Resource-based, product-market position, Competences, technological 
evolution, dominant design, dynamic competitive analysis, dynamic industry structure) 
1. Introduction 
Two streams of research have been useful in explaining the sources of 
competitive advantage. The first, the product-market position view, holds that a firm's 
profitability depends on the attractiveness of the industry in which the firm competes and 
its positioning in the industry as well as its local environment (Porter, 1980, 1990, 1991). 
The second, the resource-based perspective, maintains that a firm makes profits from 
having competences and firm-specific assets1 that are scarce and difficult to replicate 
(Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1984; Wenerfelt, 1984; Cool and Schendel, 1988; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Barney, 1991; Quinn, 1992; Henderson, 1994). Both perspectives are 
static. They explain what it takes to be profitable at any point and time. But industry 
structures are not static. Barriers to entry, the nature and sources of substitutes, the 
number and kinds of rivals, suppliers and customers often change making what is an 
attractive industry and product-market position today not so attractive tomorrow. 
Competences that once were useful in exploiting certain markets may be rendered 
obsolete by structural changes such as deregulation or technological discontinuities 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Irreversible investments in 
assets such as plants can also be rendered obsolete. 
We argue that the search for a dynamic theory of strategy and for a link between 
the product-market ar,d resource-based views may be incomplete without an exploration 
of the evolution of the technology that underlies products and heterogeneous firm 
capability. Our argument rests on the Utterback and Abernathy (1975) dynamic model of 
innovation, the Utterback & Kim (1986) hypotheses on discontinuous change in a 
product, and the Utterback and Suarez (1993) model on the dynamics of innovation 
among multiple productive units. The models suggest that technology evolves as the 
firms exploiting it interact with their environments. As the technology evolves, so do 
There is some confusion in the strategy literature when it comes to the definition of capabilities, 
resources, firm-specific assets, and competences. In this paper, the words resources and capabilities are 
used interchangeably. Competences + firm-specific assets = capabilities or resources. 
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industry structure, attractiveness and critical success factors. The evolution determines 
what kinds of products (low cost, niche or differentiated) can be offered at each of the 
stages of evolution. To offer any of these products (and therefore survive), a firm needs 
certain kinds of strategies and capabilities. The firms that don't have these capabilities 
and therefore cannot offer the specific products of the particular stage, are forced to exit. 
Thus, an industry's attractiveness and the kinds of capabilities that a firm needs to 
succeed also vary from one stage of the evolution to the other, suggesting different 
strategies for each stage. A firm's heterogeneous capability in the latter part of the 
evolution, and therefore its strategy, can be expected to depend on its strategies, 
capabilities and market positioning early in the life of the technology. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we review several models 
of innovation as well as the product market-position and resource-based static models to 
lay the groundwork for the dynamic competitive model that follows. In Section 3, we 
present the model. At each phase of the technological evolution cycle, we explore the 
pressures exerted by Porter's (1980) five forces and suggest strategies that anticipate the 
needs of that phase and the phase(s) that follow. We also explore the competences that 
are required to offer the products of each phase and the extent to which each firm's 
unique capabilities allow it to offer those products. In Section 4, we summarize our 
arguments and discuss some issues for further research. 
2. Background Material 
Technological Evolution and Industry Structure 
The Utterback and Abernathy dynamic model of innovation (Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975; Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; and Utterback, 1994) details the 
dynamic processes that take place within an industry and within member firms during the 
evolution of a technology. According to the model, at the onset of an innovation, in thefluid 
phase, there is a lot of product and market uncertainty. Manufacturers are not quite sure of what 
should go into the product. Customers may not know what they want in the product either. 
There is competition between the new and old technologies as well as between different designs 
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using the new technology. Manufacturers interact with their local environment of suppliers, 
customers, complementary innovators and competitors to resolve both technological and market 
uncertainties. 
The evolution enters the transitional phase when some standardization of components, 
market needs and product design features takes place, and a dominant design emerges signaling 
a substantial reduction in uncertainty, experimentation and major design changes. A dominant 
design is one whose major components and underlying core concepts don't vary substantially 
from one product model to the other, and the design commands a high percentage of the market 
share. The rate of major product innovations decreases and emphasis shifts to process innovation 
and incremental innovation. Competition is based largely on differentiated products. 
In the specific phase products built around the dominant design proliferate, and there is 
more and more emphasis on process innovation with product innovations being largely 
incremental. Products are highly defined with differences between competitors' products often 
fewer than similarities. The pattern described above repeats itself when a new technology with 
the potential to render the old one non-competitive is introduced, often by a competitor from 
outside the established industry. This results in a discontinuity, plunging the innovation cycle 
back to the fluid phase with another wave of entering firms. 
Tushman and Rosenkopt (1992) present a similar technology life cycle model, 
emphasizing the role that a product's complexity plays in determining the extent to which non- 
technical factors influence the evolution of the technology. The more complexity, the more 
influential non-technical f a ~ t o r s 4 . g . ~  complementary assets and organizations in the local 
environment-are likely to be in determining the course of an innovation's evolution and the less 
likely the selection process reflects economic efficiency. That is, the best technology is more 
likely to win in simple products like glass than it is in complex ones like computers. 
This dynamic process described by both models has a direct effect on industry 
structure. Utterback (1994) suggests that competition in an industry is a reflection of the 
changes in products and processes stemming from technological evolution. Thus, in the 
fluid state where product and market requirements are still ambiguous, there is expected 
to be rapid entry of firms with very few or no failures. Following the emergence of a 
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dominant design, the rate of exits increases, rapidly decreasing the number of 
competitors. If the standard is open, however, the number of entries may actually rise, 
increasing the total number of competitors. For example, when IBM entered the PC 
market and its PC quickly emerged as the dominant design, many firms entered since the 
company made the design open. Eventually, the market reaches a point of stability, 
corresponding to the specific state, in which there are only a few firms, having 
standardized or slightly differentiated products, and relatively stable sales and market 
shares. 
Figure 1 shows how the structure of an industry changes over the life of the 
underlying technology. It illustrates the case of the supercomputer industry where until 
the 1980s, Cray Research, and Control Data Corporation (CDC) dominated the market. 
In the early 1980s, new entrants entered using minisupercomputer technology. In the 
mid-1980s, others entered with massively parallel processor technology. In the 1990s 
more firms are failing, signaling some semblance of the emergence of a dominant 
design. Utterback and Suarez provide evidence of these changes in industry structure for 
typewriter, automobile, television, picture tube, transistor, calculator, and integrated 
circuit industries. Klepper and Simons (1993) provide similar evidence for automobiles, 
tires, televisions and penicillin. 
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Figure 1: Number of firms participating in the supercomputer industry 
Current Models 
Product Market Position. The evolution of industry structure and the changes in 
critical success factors suggest that each phase of the industrial innovation cycle requires 
a different strategy and that success at any phase is a function of present and previous 
strategies. However, dominant industry strategy models have been static (Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen, 1994). According to porter (1980, 1990, 199 1) the success of a firm is deeply 
rooted in the structure of the industry in which it operates, its position in the industry, 
and its local environment. Competition varies from industry to industry, and so do the 
opportunities for sustained profitability. It also varies from nation to nation, and 
sometimes from region to region as a function of the local environment (Porter, 1990). 
For each industry, five competitive forces combine to erode the long term profitability of 
any industry or segment of it: the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitute products 
or services, the bargaining power of suppliers, the bargaining power of buyers and the 
rivalry among existing competitors. The stronger these forces in an industry, the lower 
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the profitability of the industry. New entrants increase competition and therefore drive 
down profit margins. Availability of close substitutes makes it more difficult for the 
manufacturer to raise its prices without driving customers to waiting substitutes. 
Powerful suppliers can increase cost while powerful customers can bargain away profit 
margins. Rivalry among competitors results in erosion of profit margins in the form of 
lower prices for customers and increased cost of sales. The strength of each of the five 
forces is a function of industry structure. For example, the threat of entry is a function of 
entry barriers such as the history of retaliation of incumbents, brand loyalty, or 
economies of scale. Some industries, by their nature, offer more attractive opportunities 
for sustainable profits than others. 
Resource-based view. In the "resource-based" view (Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1984; 
Wenerfelt, 1984; Cool and Schendel, 1988; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Quinn, 1992; 
Henderson, 1994), the focus is on the firm, in particular, on its unique resources or 
capabilities. Success comes not from being well-positioned in an attractive industry but 
from having firm-specific assets and competences that are difficult to imitate, replicate 
or substitute. Firm-specific assets include reputation, patents, trademarks, specialized 
production facilities and computer installed base. A firm's competence is its ability to 
integrate different skills and knowledge among individuals, groups and organizations to 
deliver high perceived customer value (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
3. A Dynamic Competitive Analysis Model 
From the models just reviewed, it is evident that industry structure, the types of 
products that can be offered, as well as the nature of competences and firm-specific 
assets that a firm needs to be profitable, vary from one phase of the industrial innovation 
cycle to the other. The attractiveness of an industry to a firm is therefore a function, not 
only of the forces being exerted in the present phase, but of the competences of the firm 
and the actions it took in the previous phase(s). First, at each of the four phases of the 
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industrial innovation cycle, the firm analyzes the pressures being exerted by Porter's 
(1980) five forces to determine the industry's attractiveness. This is illustrated in Figure 
2. Second, the firm evaluates the extent to which its competences and firm-specific assets 
meet the levels and quality needed to be successful at each phase. Finally, at each phase, 
the firm takes strategic steps that anticipate the nature of the next phase(s). 
Figure 2: Industry attractiveness over the phases of the technology life cycle 
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Industry Attractiveness-Five Forces 
As discussed above, the five forces exert different pressures at the different 
phases of the technological evolution cycle. In this section, we explore the role of each 
of these forces at each phase and the kinds of strategies that can give a firm a competitive 
advantage. 
Fluid Phase. Since early phase products are highly differentiated and serve niche 
markets, rivalry among existing competitors is not expected to be as high as in later 
phases. As more new entrants enter, however, even the niches may become crowded 
increasing rivalry. If the technological discontinuity that ushered the fluid phase destroys 
the competences and firm-specific assets that incumbents had accumulated in the specific 
phase, the threat of new entrants is very high. Given early stage technological and 
market uncertainties, incumbents cannot take some of the measures that they would take 
in more stable conditions to keep out new entrants. For example, making irreversible 
commitments in capacity or staking out product-market positions is more difficult since 
uncertainty about what markets to serve or products to develop still looms large. The 
bargaining power of suppliers is low since materials and equipment are general-purpose. 
The bargaining power of customers is also moderately high since the products they buy 
are highly differentiated and many customers may be lead users. The threat of substitutes 
comes largely from the old technology that is being replaced by the new. As Utterback 
and Kim (1986) have shown, some of the best innovations in the older technology may 
come when the threat of the invading technology is becoming a reality. The effects of the 
five forces on the manufacturer are summarized in Table 1. 
Strategies. To some extent, the type of strategy pursued is a function of whether the firm 
is a leader, follower, or fast ~ e c o n d . ~  In anticipation of the transitional phase in which a 
dominant design or standard may be expected to emerge, a leader can invest in helping 
its own design emerge as the dominant design (Hariharan and Prahalad, 1994). Such 
Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion and several others. Leader here would be 
equivalent to a firm with an offensive strategy using Freeman's (1982) terminology. 
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efforts are particularly useful for products for which network externalities are important; 
in fact, so useful that the firm still stands to benefit even if its product does not become 
the standard (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). For example, Sun Microsystems' easy 
licensing of its SPARC technology to anyone who wanted it may have helped its position 
in the RISC workstation business (Khazan and Mowery, 1992). Rather than compete to 
win the dominant design, a follower or fast second may concentrate on building its 
complementary assets to take advantage of the dominant design when it eventually 
emerges. 
Force Pressure in the fluid ~ h a s e  
Rivalry among Low since products are highly differentiated and often unique 
existing May be increased by campaigns to win the dominant design of the transitional 
competitors phase 
Threat of new High. Given high market and technological uncertainty, it is difficult to erect 
entrants barriers to entry. 
Threats from alternate technologies with comparable pricelperformance 
Bargaining Low since materials and equipment used are usually of general-purpose 
power of 
suppliers 
Bargaining High since products are still unique and most users are lead users 
power of 
customers 
Threat of High, especially from old products that are still viable substitutes in many 
substitutes applications 
Some strategies Focus on niche products 
Build complementary assets 
Invest to try and influence the dominant design of the transitional phase 
Table 1: Industry attractiveness at the fluid phase 
Transitional Phase. With the emergence of a dominant design, many of the product 
and market uncertainties of the fluid phase are reduced. This results in more rivalry 
among existing competitors as the "winners" of the dominant design scramble to win 
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new customers with a product that is less differentiated than at the fluid phase. With 
product innovation giving way to process innovation, firms scramble to invest in 
capacity in research and development, in advertising and other measures designed to 
signal commitment to specific market positions in preparation for entering the specific 
phases with concomitant higher volumes of production. The threat of new entrants 
depends on whether the dominant design is proprietary or open. It is high if the design is 
open, and low if proprietary since product and market uncertainties have been reduced 
with the emergence of a dominant design and better defined markets. The bargaining 
power of suppliers increases (compared to the fluid phase) since the equipment and 
materials are now more specialized. Since the emergence of a dominant design allows 
for differentiated but not unique products, the bargaining power of customers increases. 
An open design also increases the bargaining power of suppliers and customers. The 
threat of substitutes becomes higher since the products being sold are less niche oriented 
than earlier. These effects are summarized in Table 2. 
Force Pressure in the transitional phase 
Rivalry among Low but the emergence of a dominant design increases rivalry leading to an 
existing industry "shake out" 
competitors 
Threat of new 
entrants 
Differentiated products assure some level of protection from new entrants 
but threat increases with the emergence of standard or dominant design. 
Low if "winners" of dominant design keep technology proprietary 
High if "winners" of dominant design license technology generously 
Bargaining power Higher than in the fluid phase since materials and equipment become more 
of suppliers specialized 
Bargaining power Higher than in the fluid phase since products are no longer unique 
of customers 
Threat of Higher than at the fluid phase as products become more standard 
substitutes 
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Some strategies Focus on differentiated products 
Make irreversible investments in capacity, brand advertising, process and 
product R&D in preparation for specific phase. 
Contract with suppliers for equipment or specialized materials that will be 
needed in the specific phase. 
Table 2: Industry attractiveness at the transitional phase 
Strategies. Strategic alliances or licensing policies could help the firm win or 
consolidate the dominant design. The firm can start preparing for providing low cost 
products in the specific state by making irreversible investments in capacity, process 
R&D, and advertising to establish brand name recognition. It can also locate and acquire 
intellectual property rights or enter special contracts with suppliers for key factors of 
production. 
Specific Phase. In the specific phase, competition is oligopolistic with a few firms that 
produce commodity products from a dominant design. The forces exerted on a firm in an 
industry are shown in Table 3. Rivalry among these firms is high given the commodity 
nature of the products they sell. It is even higher if the design is open. Competition uses 
such tools as incremental product or process innovations. For example, some automobile 
makers have used such incremental product innovations as electronic fuel injection, anti- 
lock brakes, all-wheel-drive and air bags to try to gain an advantage. The rate of such 
innovations, and therefore of the amount of rivalry, is also a function of such 
environmental factors as how demanding customers or government regulators are 
(Porter, 1990, Thomas, 1989). An incumbent can also stake out a product-market 
position by making non-reversible investments in capacity or advertising thus signaling 
to rivals that any entry into its product-market space will be met with retaliation 
(Schmalensee, 1983; Ghemawat, 199 1). For example, a computer memory chipmaker 
who invests $1.3 billion to build a manufacturing facility signals to its competitors that it 
will be in that market for computer memory chips for the long haul. 
Several factors reduce the threat of new entrants who want to use the prevailing 
technology to enter (Oster, 1994). In the first place, incumbents may have certain 
advantages over new entrants. For example, they may have licenses and patents that give 
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them exclusive access to complementary technologies, supplies or special distribution 
channels. They may also be further along the technology learning curve, or have 
established brand names and reputations through prior advertising and performance. In 
the second place, incumbents may exhibit certain characteristics that signal new entrants 
that they will fight entry by, say lowering their prices. For example, incumbents with 
high irreversible investments in firm-specific assets, excess capacity, or a reputation for 
retaliating against new entrants are likely to keep out new entrants from entering their 
market. If an incumbent has high exit costs, it is also more likely to fight to stay in the 
industry than one without. The biggest threat, therefore, comes from new entrants that 
are using an invading technology that can render incumbent competences and firm- or 
technology-specific assets obsolete. For example, electronic cash registers rendered 
NCR's competences, and irreversible investments in capacity and service centers 
obsolete. This allowed Singer to use electronic cash registers to invade the 
electromechanical cash register market. 
Force Pressure in the specific phase 
Rivalry among High because of the commodity nature of products 
existing May be reduced by such things as tacit collusion 
competitors 
Threat of new Low because of measures such as: irreversible investments in capacity, 
entrants brand name, patents, special licenses or contracts and distribution channels; 
reputation for retaliating. 
There may also be a threat from alternate technologies with better 
pricelperformance potentials. 
Bargaining power High for major suppliers of specialized materials and equipment who are 
of suppliers also sources of innovations, especially process innovation. 
Bargaining power Higher since product is more or less a commodity 
of customers 
Threat of 
substitutes 
High especially from invading technologies. 
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Some strategies Focus on low cost 
Emphasize quality 
Signal commitments by advertising, investing in capacity and R&D. 
Table 3: Industry attractiveness at the specific phase. 
The threat of substitutes is mostly from new technologies although in some cases 
it may be from so-called generics when, for example, an incumbent's patent has expired. 
On the other hand, the bargaining power of suppliers is high since they supply 
specialized equipment and materials, and are a major source of innovations. So is the 
bargaining power of customers since products are more or less a commodity. In both 
cases, the bargaining power may be reduced by collusion on the part of rivals. 
Strategies. A firm can pursue several strategies. For the specific phase, the firm could 
maintain a low cost strategy given that the products being sold are largely 
undifferentiated commodities and most innovations are process innovations earmarked 
for cost reduction. Some product differentiation is possible but more a matter of 
positioning. For example, Honda's positioning the Acura brand cars in a more luxury 
bracket than the Honda brand. Mass customization can also give a firm an advantage 
(Pine, 1993). The firm can also make irreversible investments in capacity or build a 
reputation for retaliation to signal to rivals and new entrants alike to stay out of its 
product-market positions. Since the biggest threat is that of an invading technology that 
will take the industry into a more turbulent period, the firm can scan sibling technologies 
to better detect the arrival and potential of a viable discontinuity (Afuah, 1996). 
Discontinuities. A technological discontinuity sometimes renders the old technology 
non-competitive, and many of the barriers that firms have erected around them in the 
specific phase may become useless. Irreversible investments in plant capacity and R&D, 
special licenses, contracts for special materials or services may become obsolete. For 
example, the arrival of electronic cash registers destroyed a lot of the barriers to entry 
such as specialized plants, excellent service networks, investments in R&D for 
electromechanics, patents, and other intellectual property that NCR had accumulated in 
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exploiting electromechanical cash registers. Technological discontinuities normally level 
the playing ground since incumbent existing capabilities may be rendered obsolete 
(Foster, 1986; Utterback, 1994). 
The impact of a discontinuity on industry attractiveness is summarized in Table 
4. The threat of new entrants is high since the playing ground has been leveled and 
incumbent existing capabilities may not only be useless, they may actually become a 
handicap. The threat of substitutes, from the new technology is now very high. Rivalry 
among incumbents gets higher as the new technology invades the old and incumbents 
who have not switched to the new technology are increasingly squeezed. As 
manufacturers leave specialized materials and equipment of the specific state to turn to 
the general-purpose equipment of the emergent fluid phase, the bargaining power of 
suppliers drops. The impending discontinuity further increases the bargaining power of 
customers. 
Force Pressure in the discontinuity phase 
Rivalry among Low or high depending on the reaction of incumbents 
existing 
competitors 
Threat of new High since new entrants can use the new technology to enter 
entrants 
Bargaining power Low since their specialized materials and equipment may be replaced soon 
of suppliers by general purpose materials and equipment. 
Bargaining power High since discontinuity leads to fluid phase with its unique products 
of customers 
Threat of High 
substitutes 
Some strategies Ensure compatibility with old technology if technology exhibits network 
externalities. 
Take necessary steps to identify lead users 
Table 4: Industry attractiveness at the discontinuity phase 
Dynamic Competitive Strategies: Responding to Structural Industry Changes 
Strategies. Depending on their innovation strategies, leaders may want to cannibalize 
their own products and quickly embrace the new technology. However, this behavior is 
seldom observed. They may also retrench to attempt to prolong the viability of their 
established positions for as long as possible. Where network externalities are important, a 
manufacturer may want to insure that he new product is compatible with the older ones. 
For example, in developing its user-friendly Windows operating system, Microsoft made 
sure that it was compatible to the character-based DOS operating system. A firm can also 
identify lead users that will be helpful in the product development of the fluid phase and 
try to work out joint developments. 
Competences and Firm-Specific Assets 
The capabilities that a firm needs to be successful also vary from one phase to the 
other. Since firms within an industry have different capabilities that allow them to earn 
different levels of economic rents (Cool and Schendel, 1988; Barney, 1991; Nelson, 
1991), an industry's attractiveness to a firm is also a function of the extent to which the 
firm's competences and firm-specific assets match the levels that are needed to be 
successful in the industry. The strategy process, then, consists of (following the 
determination of industry attractiveness as outlined above): 1) determining what kinds of 
competences and firm-specific assets are necessary to stake out a profitable market 
position (low cost or product differentiation) for that particular industry at each phase of 
the industrial innovation cycle, 2) examining the firm's own competences and firm- 
specific assets to see to what extent they can allow the firm to compete in the industry at 
the phase in question, 3) establishing strategies at each phase to build competences and 
firm-specific assets for that phase and the next one(s). 
Fluid Phase. Given the high technological and market uncertainty of the fluid state, a 
firm needs the ability to make some sense out of chaos, communicate well with 
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customers to help them identify their needs, and work with lead users. Since the fluid 
phase is often ushered in by a competence-destroying technological change that requires 
completely new knowledge (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986), there may be some problems unique to incumbents. An incumbent's history- 
especially the competences and firm-specific assets acquired in the specific phase of the 
previous technology-play a vital role in where it searches for the new technological 
information and the kinds of decisions that it takes (1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Bettis and Prahalad, 1995). Thus an incumbent's perception of the attractiveness of an 
industry may be greatly biased by its history. For example, NCR saw the invading cash 
registers as only a faster way of adding numbers. It did not see them as a new tool for its 
customers to better manage their inventories and supplier-relations (Afuah, 1996). 
Incumbents may have to unlearn most of what made them so successful in the specific 
state of the previous technology (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995). 
Sample competences Ability to: 
Manage projects 
patent 
unlearn old competences and acquire new ones 
make sense out of chaos 
work with suppliers to modify general purpose equipment to meet unique 
needs 
decipher customer needs and translate to products 
make sense out of customer feedback 
communicate with complementary innovators to understand how they can 
provide complementary products 
Sfrategies Focus on key customers, especially lead users, and their needs 
Build technical competences, project management skills and endowments 
such as patents. 
Table 5: Competences and firm-specific assets needed to succeed in the fluid phase 
Examples of the types of competences required to perform well at the fluid phase 
are shown in Table 5. The ability to decipher customer needs and translate them into 
products, for example, is a good competence while skilled personnel and good 
relationships with suppliers and lead users are valuable firm-specific assets. 
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Strategies. For the leader, the focus is in building the capabilities that will enable it to 
win the dominant design. These can include building a stock of patents to use as a 
bargaining chip in establishing alliances. For the follower or fast second, the focus could 
be on building the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1991) so that it can quickly 
imitate the dominant design when it emerges. 
Transitional. The emergence of a dominant design greatly reduces both product and 
market uncertainties and suggests the need for competences that are different from those 
of the fluid phase. Whereas, in the fluid phase, the focus was on those capabilities that 
allow one to determine what features to include in the product, in the transitional phase, 
attention shifts to how to improve the values of those features. There is a shift from 
major product innovations to process innovations and a corresponding shift in skills. As 
materials and equipment become more specialized the need for supplier-focused 
competences also increases. As products are no longer niche but differentiated, the need 
for customer-focused competences also increases. 
A strong reputation in related technologies or products, and strategic alliances can 
help win the dominant design. For example, IBM's reputation in mainframes and 
minicomputers was instrumental in making its PC the standard. Examples of the types of 
competences and firm-specific assets that a firm must have to perform well at the 
transitional phase are shown in Table 6. 
Strategies. Prior to the emergence of the dominant design, strategic maneuvering such 
as detailed by Cusumano, Mylonadis and Rosenbloom (1992) in the case of VHS 
emerging as the standard for video tape recording can take advantage of existing 
capabilities. Building of customer-and supplier-focused competences may also be 
valuable given the switch from using generic supplies to using more specialized ones. 
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Sample competences Ability to: 
design products that meet customer needs 
know where to make irreversible investments 
negotiate contracts for specialized materials and equipment that are needed in the 
specific phase 
synthesize emerging customer needs 
develop installed base, distribution and service networks 
build network of complementary innovators 
Strategies Focus on skills for product differentiation 
Focus more attention on marketing than in the fluid phase 
In preparation for specific phase, advertise to establish brand recognition 
Table 6: Competences and firm-specific assets needed to succeed in the transitional 
phase 
Specific Phase. Since products are largely commodity in the specific phase, emphasis 
is on those competences and firm-specific assets that allow a firm to produce at low cost 
and profit from it Low costs are attained largely through process and incremental 
product innovations. Special licenses or patents that give a firm unique access to low cost 
processes can give a firm a competitive advantage. The source of process innovations is 
often major suppliers of specialized equipment who, in this phase, have high bargaining 
power. Special contracts, unique supplier-relations or special skills in dealing with such 
suppliers can be important. Close supplier relations that allow for co-development of 
components or close monitoring of incremental innovations from suppliers can be assets 
in the specific phase. Low cost and some product differentiation can also come from 
incremental product innovations. Such incremental innovations, by definition, require 
skills that build on existing competences and firm-specific assets. This gives incumbents 
an advantage since they already have the competences and firm-specific assets to build 
on for incremental innovations. Some innovations which masquerade as being 
incremental, however, may actually be architectural and can present firms that view them 
as incremental with problems (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
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Sample competences Ability to: 
Design for manufacturability 
Reduce cycle times 
Effect process and incremental innovation expertise 
integrate innovations from supplier to own processes 
sell 
create new distribution channels 
co-ordinate innovations with complementary innovators 
Strategies Focus on competencies that assure low cost and profitability from it 
Boost process innovation and incremental product innovation skills 
Scan and prepare for invading technologies 
Table 7: Competences and firm-specific assets needed to succeed in the specific phase 
Given that the bargaining power of customers and rivalry among existing 
competitors are high, a firm's customer-focused competences and firm-specific assets can 
be particularly valuable. For example, a firm's brand names, reputation for high quality 
products, networks of service centers, distribution channels, user networks, and ability to 
synthesize customer needs into product attributes and a language that product developers 
can implement technologically are invaluable. Examples of the types of competences 
required to perform well at the specific phase are shown in Table 7. 
Strategies. As we show shortly, all these acquired competences and firm-specific assets 
can become a handicap in the face of a competence-destroying technological 
discontinuity. Thus the biggest challenge to a firm in the specific phase is balancing the 
act of exploiting the old technology while getting ready for the inevitable arrival of the 
new one (Tyre and Hauptman, 1992). Strategies in this phase are focused on preparing 
for the discontinuity and fluid states. 
Discontinuities. It usually takes a discontinuity to move from the specific phase of one 
technological evolution cycle to the fluid phase of the next cycle. A technological 
discontinuity can be competence-enhancing if the capabilities required to exploit it build 
on those used to exploit the previous technology (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Such a 
discontinuity would tend to perpetuate the oligopolies of the specific state. If, however, 
the technology is competence-destroying in that the capabilities required to exploit it are 
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significantly different from existing ones, then a firm's accumulated competences and 
firm-specific assets may not only useless, they may actually constitute a handicap for the 
firm (Henderson and Clark, 1990). In any case, the first step in coping with or taking 
advantage of a technological discontinuity is to recognize the potential or threat that the 
new technology poses early enough to take appropriate action (Afuah, 1996). 
A competence-destroying technological innovation usually levels the playing 
field but incumbents (from the oligopoly of the specific phase) may be shackled by the 
competences and firm-specific assets that had been a source of competitive advantage in 
the specific phase (Leonard-Barton, 1992). The technological change may not obsolete 
all of an incumbent's capabilities to exploit it. For example, if a discontinuity obsoletes 
only product-focused competences and firm-specific assets, leaving market competences 
and market-specific assets intact, then incumbents have an advantage (Mitchell, 1989). 
Similarly, if supplier-focused capabilities are left intact in industries where supplier 
relations are important, incumbents may also have an advantage. Thus a firm's ability to 
recognize just which of its capabilities will be obsoleted by the arrival of a technological 
discontinuity and to build those capabilities while taking advantage of those capabilities 
that are not impacted by the technology can also be an asset. An understanding of, and 
better relationships with value networks can make the task of dealing with discontinuities 
easier to handle (Christensen and Roosenbloom, 1995). 
Strategy. It is important to focus on recognizing the potential of the threats and 
opportunities that the discontinuity presents. Additionally for incumbents, the primary 
focus is on unlearning the old knowledge so that it may not be a handicap in exploiting 
the new (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995). In anticipation of the fluid state, a firm may also 
start acquiring the skills that it needs to cope with the rapid rate of product innovations 
of the fluid phase. Quinn (1992) suggest that in this state, a firm should look at its 
portfolio of competences to see which ones best fit the new technology. 
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Sample competences Ability to: 
recognize the threats and potential of new technologies early 
recognize supplier-originated innovations 
make discontinuities transparent to customers 
recognize customer-originated technological discontinuities 
make discontinuities transparent to complementary innovators 
Strategies Focus on recognizing the potential threats and opportunities of the discontinuity 
Unlearning of old skills by incumbents is critical 
Table 8: Competences and firm-specific assets needed to succeed in the discontinuity 
phase 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
We proposed a dynamic strategy model based on a technological evolution 
perspective which suggests a link between the product-market position and the resource- 
based views of competitive advantage. Drawing on various dynamic models of 
innovation, we argued that the technologies which underlie low cost, product 
differentiation, and firm heterogeneous capabilities evolve over time as the firms 
exploiting them interact with their environments and resolve uncertainties. As 
technology evolves, so do industry characteristics and critical success factors. The 
evolution determines what kinds of products (niche, differentiated or low cost) can be 
offered at each of the phases. Firms that do not have the capabilities to offer these 
products may be forced to exit. Thus an industry's attractiveness and the kinds of 
capabilities that a firm needs to succeed, may also vary from phase to phase suggesting 
different strategies for each phase. A firm's strategies and heterogeneous capability in 
one phase, depend on its strategy, and capabilities in the previous phase(s). 
With this background information, we proposed a dynamic competitive model. In 
the model, we argued that since industry structure and critical success factors change as 
the underlying technology evolves from phase to phase, the competitive pressures 
exerted on a firm necessarily vary. Moreover, since only certain products can be offered 
at each phase and firm capabilities are unique, an industry that is attractive to one firm 
may not be to another. Based on these arguments, we proposed a three-step process for 
competitive analysis: First, at each of the four phases of the industrial innovation cycle, 
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the firm analyzes the pressures being exerted by Porter's (1980) five forces to determine 
the industry's attractiveness. Second, the firm evaluates the extent to which its 
competences and firm-specific assets meet the levels and quality needed to successful 
offer products at each phase. Finally, at each phase, the firm takes strategic steps that 
also anticipate the nature of the next phase(s). 
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